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TORTS-GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY UNDER THE NEW MEXICO
TORT CLAIMS ACT.
INTRODUCTION
The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity was abolished by
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Hicks v. State as of July 1, 1976.1
This doctrine had protected the State from tort liability under the
judicial categories created by the New Mexico courts.2 The Hicks3
court relied upon several public policy considerations in abandoning
this ancient doctrine, which was intended primarily to protect the
fiscal integrity of the state.4 The court held that the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity could no longer be interposed as a
defense by the state or any of its political subdivisons in tort actions
s
The New Mexico Legislature responded to the Hicks decision by
reinstating government immunity under the Tort Claims Act.
6 The
Act went into effect on July 1, 1976,' thereby superseding the Hicks
decision. Both the legislative statement of purpose and the design of
the Act indicate that it is intended to protect the public treasury and
the state from extensive tort liability. This is done by confining gov-
ernmental tort liability to the restrictive terms of the Act.'
1. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975),rehearing 88 N.M. 593,544 P.2d 1158 (1976).
2. See Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L.
Rev. 249, 251-61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kovnat].
3. The Hicks court abolished the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in order
to provide individual citizens with a remedy against the state in tort actions. The court em-
phasized that the state could secure financial protection against harsh liability judgments by
purchasing insurance and by distributing its losses to the populace, while individuals suffer
manifest injustice in having to bear the entire financial burden alone. Hicks v. State, 88 N.M.
at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155, rehearing 88 N.M. 593, 544 P.2d 1158 (1976).
4. Kovnat, supra note 2, at 250.
5. Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. at 592, 544 P.2d at 1157, rehearing 88 N.M. 593, 544 P.2d
1158 (1976).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 41-4-1 to 26 (1978 and Supp. 1980).
7. See Kovnat, supra note 2, at 251.
8. The legislative declaration of purpose contained in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-2 (1978)
reads as follows:
A. The legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results
which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
On the other hand, the legislature recognizes that while a private party may
readily be held liable for his torts within the chosen ambit of his activity, the
area within which the government has the power to act for the public good is
almost without limit, and therefore government should not have the duty to
do everything that might be done. Consequently, it is declared to be the public
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The tensions between the legislative and judicial policies concern-ing the doctrine of sovereign immunity are apparent in several cases
recently decided under the Act. 9 In these cases, the New Mexico Su-preme Court and Court of Appeals have repeatedly upheld claims
arising under the restrictive language and design of the Tort Claims
Act. The New Mexico judiciary also has indicated its reliance on theprinciples established in Hicks when construing the terms of the Act.
This Note focuses on the conflict between the intended legislative
purpose of the Act and the judicial construction of its terms.
ANALYSIS OF THE ACT
The legislative statement of purpose highlights the three majorgoals of the Tort Claims Act.' 0 The primary goal is to protect thepublic treasury by limiting the government's liability for its torts.
Second, the Act protects governmental entities and public em-ployees from extensive tort liability. The third purpose of the Act is
to abolish common law categories so that liability is based upon a
negligence standard of care. The statute is so designed, however, that
only the first two goals are advanced.
Section 4 of the Act clothes the government with immunity fromtort liability subject only to authorized exceptions.' 1 Under these
policy of New Mexico that governmental entities and public employees shall
only be liable within the limitations of the Tort Claims Act [41-4-1 to 41-4-25NMSA 1978] and in accordance with the principles established in that act.B. The Tort Claims Act shall be read as abolishing all judicially-created
categories such as "governmental" or "proprietary" functions and "discretion-
ary" or "ministerial" acts previously used to determine immunity or liability.Liability for acts or omissions under the Tort Claims Act shall be based uponthe traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent person's
standard of care in the performance of that duty. The Tort Claims Act in no
way imposes a strict liability for injuries upon governmental entities or public
employees. Determination of the standard of care required in any particularinstance should be made with the knowledge that each governmental entityhas financial limitations within which it must exercise authorized power anddiscretion in determining the extent and nature of its activities.9. The cases discussed in this note include: Holiday Management v. City of Santa Fe, 94N.M. 368, 610 P.2d 1197 (1980); City of Albuquerque v. Redding, 93 N.M. 757, 605 P.2d1156 (1980); Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 618 P.2d 894 (1980);Moore v. State, 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1980); Methola v. County of Eddy, 20N.M. St. Bar Bull. 138, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-2 (1978). See also note 8supra.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-4 (1978). This section reads in part as follows:A. A governmental entity and any public employee while acting within the
scope of duty are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as
waived by Sections 41-4-5 through 41-4-12 NMSA 1978. Waiver of this im-
munity shall be limited to and governed by the provisions of Sections 41-4-13
through 41-4-25 NMSA 1978.
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categories, immunity from tort liability is waived when public em-
ployees are negligent in performing governmental activities which
may also be performed by the private sector.' 2 The Act generally
retains immunity for public employees' I whose duties involve the
determination and execution of fundamental government policy. 4
All legislative, judicial, and administrative officers receive immunity
as public employees while acting within the scope of their duties.
Law enforcement officers' ' are exempt from the general grant of
12. The Act waives governmental immunity under the following categories included
within N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 41-4-5 to 12 (1978 & Supp. 1980):
Section 5 negligent operation of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft;
Section 6 negligent operation or maintenance of any building, public park,
machinery, equipment or furnishings;
Section 7 negligent operation of an airport unless the liability is due to a
condition arising out of a compliance with a federal or state law or
regulation governing the use and operation of airports;
Section 8 negligent operation of utilities, specifically, gas, electricity, water,
solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, heating and ground
transportation, but not including damages caused either by a fail-
ure to provide an adequate supply or from polluting the land, air
or water;
Section 9 negligent operation of any hospital or outpatient health care facil-
ity;
Section 10 negligent providing of health care services by public employees
licensed by the state or permitted by law to provide these services;
Section 11 negligent maintenance or operation of any bridge, culvert, high-
way, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area, but not in-
cluding liability for any plan or design defect in any of the above;
Section 12 enumerated torts caused by law enforcement officers, while acting
within the scope of their duties.
Common law liability was imposed for activities previously categorized as proprietary, cor-
porate or ministerial functions. See Kovnat, supra note 2, at 257-58, 263-64. See also, Na-
tional League of Cities, The New World of Municipal Liability (1978); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1979); Leonard, Municipal Tort Liability: A Legislative
Solution to Balancing the Needs of Cities and Plaintiffs, 16 Urban Law Ann. 305 (1979)
and W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 131 (4th ed. 1971).
13. The term "public employee" is defined under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-3(E) (1978),
as follows:
E. "public employee" means any officer, employee or servant of a govern-
mental entity, including elected or appointed officials, law enforcement
officers and persons acting on behalf or in service of a governmental entity
in any official capacity, whether with or without compensation, but the
term does not include an independent contractor.
14. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-4 (Supp. 1980);See also note 11 supra.
15. The term "law enforcement officer" is defined under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-3(D)
(1978), as follows:
D. "law enforcement officer" means any full-time salaried public employee of
a governmental entity whose principal duties under law are to hold in cus-
tody any person accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order or
to make arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when called
to active duty by the governor.
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immunity if their actions fall within Section 12 of the Act,1 6 which
waives immunity for injury or property damage resulting from the
enumerated torts "caused by law enforcement officers while acting
within the scope of their duties."1 7
The Act also includes several provisions which protect public
funds by restricting the availability of tort claims brought against the
government and the amount of damages awarded for those claims.' '
Claimants must comply with strict notice requirements to maintain a
claim against the government." 9 Maximum limits on governmental
tort liability are included under Section 19.20 The maximum amount
of recovery for all claims arising out of a single occurrence is limited
to $500,000.21 Further fiscal protection is afforded by allowing gov-
ernmental entities to create a public liability fund2 2 which may be
applied towards the purchase of insurance protection.2 These provi-
sions protect the state's fiscal integrity by limiting the amounts paid
in government tort claims and by dictating the management and in-
vestment of public funds.
The Act directly incorporates the judicially-created categories it
was meant to abolish,2 4 thereby defeating the third legislative pur-
pose. Because the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity
are based on these common law categories, liability is determined
under a negligence standard of care only if the tort committed falls
within one of these categories. The legislature thus has preserved the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity along with the unfair
and inequitable results which accompany its application.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (1978). Seealso text accompanying notes 57-80infra.
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (1978). See note 62 infra. The term "law enforcement
officer" was narrowly defined in Candelaria v. Robinson, 93 N.M. 786, 606 P.2d 196 (Ct.App. 1980), as excluding all public employees who qualify as legislative, judicial and admin-
istrative officers. This term has not been defined by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
18. See, generally, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 41-4-13 to -26 (1978 and Supp. 1980).
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-16 (1978). Section 16(A) requires that persons claimingdamages under the Act notify the designated public official in writing within 90 days of thedate of the occurrence giving rise to the claim. Under Section 16(B), persons who are in-
capacitated due to injuries received have an additional 90 days to file notice. In wrongfuldeath cases, Section 16(C) requires that notice be brought by a personal representative
within six months after the date of the occurrence of the injury resulting in the death.
20. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19 (1978).
21. Id. Claims for property damage arising from a single occurrence are limited to$100,000. Personal injury and wrongful death claims are Imited to $300,000. Section 19(B)
prohibits awards of exemplary or punitive damages or interest prior to judgment.
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-23 (Supp. 1980). The risk management division of the State
Department of Finance operates the public liability fund for the purpose of covering all
costs and expenses arising under the Tort Claims Act
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-20 (Supp. 1980).
24. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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The language and design of the Tort Claims Act are tailored to
accomplish its primary and secondary purposes of protecting the
public debt and limiting tort liability for public officials who perform
discretionary governmental functions. The legislature's third purpose
was defeated at the inception of the Act, which incorporates the
judicially-created categories of sovereign immunity it was intended to
abolish.
CASE LAW UNDER THE TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Judicial Construction of the Act
The decisions reached in the reported cases decided under the Tort
Claims Act indicate that the courts will construe the Act in light of
the principles established in Hicks v. State.2 ' The rationale support-
ing these decisions illuminates the conflict between the policies under-
lying the Tort Claims Act and those which led to the abolition of
sovereign immunity under Hicks v. State.
The Hicks2 6 court recognized that the elimination of sovereign
immunity could result in an intolerable financial burden being placed
upon the state, but suggested that the purchase of adequate insurance
would satisfactorily alleviate this burden.' 7 The Hicks court held the
government responsible for its own acts and stated that the govern-
ment should be liable as a cost of doing business for the natural and
proximate consequences of its misconduct.2 Principles of humani-
tarianism and individual freedom support the holding of the Hicks
court that those who enjoy the fruits of the enterprise, in this case
the community as a whole, must also accept its risks and attendant
responsibilities.' 9
The New Mexico Supreme Court's stance on the issue of govern-
mental immunity under the Act first became apparent in City of
Albuquerque v. Redding.3" The plaintiff inRedding sued for damages
resulting from personal injuries she received when her bicycle tire
slipped through a drain grate in a roadway designated as a bicycle path.
The city asserted the defense of immunity under Section 1 I(B) 3' of
the Act, which exempts governmental entities from liability for dam-
25. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975), rehearing 88 N.M. 593, 544 P.2d 1158 (1976).
26. Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155.
27. Id. Section 20 of the Act provides for the coverage of risks through purchasing in-
surance. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-20 (Supp. 1980).
28. Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. at 592, 544 P.2d at 1157.
29. Id.
30. 93 N.M. 757, 605 P.2d 1156 (1980).
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-11 (1978).
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ages caused by a defect in the plan or design of a roadway.3 2 The
court found, however, that the waiver of immunity under Section 8(A)3" was applicable because the primary purpose of the grate was toprovide for solid or liquid waste collection and disposal.3 This "pri-
mary purpose test"3" was used to bridge the gap between the plain
language of the Act and the court's construction of its provisions.
The test enabled the court to uphold the plaintiff's claim under the
principles established in Hicks without relying expressly on that deci-
sion.
Conflicting Interpretations of the Act
Holiday Management Co. v. City of Santa Fe36 presented the
question of whether the city was liable for property damage caused
by its employees' negligent operation of a public utility. This damage
resulted from a sewage obstruction which caused water to back up
and spill inside the plaintiffs motel. The court of appeals held that
the city was immune from liability under Section 8(B)(1), 3' charac-
terizing Holiday Management's claim as arising from the city's failure
to provide an adequate service in liquid waste collection or disposal.3
The supreme court, however, reversed this decision, resolving the
issue under Section 8(A),3 9 which waives immunity for damages
caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the
32. Id. This section reads in part as follows:
B. The liability for which immunity has been waived pursuant to Subsec-
tion A of this section shall not include liability for damages caused by:(1) a defect in plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway,
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; ....
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-8 (1978) stating that:
A. The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 4 [41-4-4
NMSA 1978] of the Tort Claims Act does not apply to liability for damages
resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by
the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of theirduties in the operation of the following public utilities and services: gas; elec-
tricity; water; solid or liquid waste collection or disposal; heating; and ground
transportation.
34. City of Albuquerque v. Redding, 93 N.M. at 759, 605 P.2d at 1158.
35. Id.
36. Holiday Management Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 94 N.M. 368, 610 P.2d 1197 (1980).
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-8 (1978), which provides:
B. The liability imposed pursuant to Subsection A of this section shall not
include liability for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or
property damage:
(1) caused by a failure to provide an adequate supply of gas, water,
electricity or services as described in Subsection A of this section; ....
38. Holiday Management Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 66, 67 (Ct. App.
January 21, 1980).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-8 (1978). See note 33 supra.
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scope of their duties in the operation of liquid waste collection or
disposal services. 4 0
Various policy considerations governed the supreme court's deci-
sion to uphold the plaintiff's claim in Holiday Management. For the
first time, the court expressly relied on the remedial purposes ex-
pressed in the Hicks decision in construing the terms of the Act. 4'
The court also stated that negligent damage to private property
caused by the government's misuse of sewer maintenance funds was
never intended to be "swept under a governmental immunity rug."
4 2
The supreme court thus viewed the Tort Claims Act in light of Hicks
and construed the statute accordingly.
Different public policies had governed the court of appeals' deci-
sion. Although the court's construction of Section 8 seems to contra-
dict the language of the statute,4 3 its decision appears consistent with
the legislative purpose of limiting governmental tort liability. The
court acknowledged that a municipality was liable for the negligent
maintenance and operation of its sewer system under the prior com-
mon law, but stated that the Tort Claims Act reflected a legislative
need to limit the potential liability of the sovereign after the Hicks
decision.4 4 The court also reasoned that the legislature intended to
change the pre-existing law by enacting the statute after government
immunity was judicially abolished in Hicks. 4 s
The direction taken by the supreme court in Holiday Management
was followed by the court of appeals in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Tucker.4 6 Tucker involved a suit arising out of two separate accidents
which occurred when a motor vehicle collided with a cow on a public
highway. The issue addressed was whether the State Highway Depart-
ment was liable for negligence in breaching its statutory duty to
maintain the fence through which the cow had passed.4" The court
held, under Section 11 (A)4 8 of the Act, that the highway department
40. Holiday Management Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 94 N.M. at 369, 610 P.2d at 1198.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See notes 3 7-40 and accompanying text supra.
44. Holiday Management Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 67 (Ct. App.
January 21, 1980).
45. Id.
46. 95 N.M. 56, 58, 618 P.2d 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1980). In its opinion, the court of
appeals stated that "[t] he direction indicated by [the supreme court] in interpreting the
Tort Claims Act has been toward a liberal, rather than a narrow, construction of the Act."
[Citing Holiday Management Co. v. City of Santa Fe and City of Albuquerque v. Redding.]
47. This duty is imposed under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-8-13 (1978).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-11 (1978). This section states that:
A. The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4
NMSA 1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from bodily in-
Summer 1981]
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was liable for damages arising from its negligent construction and
maintenance of fences along state highways. Although the court ac-
knowledged that the word "fence" was not mentioned in this sec-
tion, it applied the Redding "primary purpose test" 4 9 in finding that
immunity was waived under the Act because the primary purpose of
the highway fence is to keep the highway safe for the motoring pub-
lic, and not to keep trespassers off of public land.' 0 The court also
noted its reliance on the position taken by the supreme court in Red-
ding and Holiday Management, where the plaintiffs' claims against
the government were upheld under the restrictive terms of the Tort
Claims Act.' I
In Moore v. State,' 2 the court of appeals relied upon Section 11
(A)5 3 of the Act in upholding the plaintiff's claim for damages result-
ing from the negligent construction of a roadway where necessary
guardrails were never installed. The court rejected the state's argu-
ment that immunity was not waived under Section 1 I(B),5 4 which
provides that liability will not be imposed for a defect in plan or de-
sign of, or for the failure to construct or reconstruct, any highway or
roadway. Instead, the court found that a governmental entity does
not enjoy immunity from liability if a claim is made that a highway
which is in existence is defective.5 s The court upheld the plaintiff's
claim by stating that the legislature did not intend to make an exist-
ing highway unsafe for the traveling public, but instead intended that
a distinction be made between a highway in existence and one not in
existence when the doctrines of immunity and waiver are applied. 5 6
The New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on the principles estab-
lished in Hicks is clearly indicated in Methola v. County of Eddy. s
jury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of public
employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the maintenance of
or for the existence of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley,
sidewalk or parking area.
49. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text, supra.
50. Fireman's Fund Ins Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. at 59, 618 P.2d at 897.
51. Id.
52. 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1980).
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-11 (1978). See note 48supra.
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-11 (1978), stating that:
B. The liability for which immunity has been waived pursuant to Subsec-
tion A of this section shall not include liability for damages caused by:
(1) a defect in plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway,
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or
(2) the failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway,
roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area.
55. 95 N.M. at 302, 621 P.2d at 519.
56. Id. The court implies that this provision was written by the legislature under the
misguided assumption that the plan or design of a non-existent highway could be unsafe for
the motoring public.
57. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 138, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
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Three cases involving similar issues were consolidated in the Methola
decision." 8 The plaintiffs in Doe-Hooton v. City of Albuquerque' I
and Methola,6 0 sued for damages resulting from personal injuries in-
flicted by other prisoners in the Bernalillo and Eddy County jails.
Recovery had been permitted at the trial level in each of these cases.6 1
The question addressed on appeal was whether Section 1 262 of the
Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity for the negligence of
law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their duties. The
court of appeals reversed the lower court decisions by holding that
both the city 6 3 and the county 6  were immune from liability under
the Act. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and held
that the named governmental entities and law enforcement officers
were not immune from suit for personal or bodily injury caused by
their negligence. 6 s The cases were remanded to the court of appeals
for a separate determination of other issues presented on appeal.
6 6
On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in
Methola v. County of Eddy, 6 7 where the plaintiff was awarded dam-
ages of $218,000, to cover the continuing costs of his custodial and
medical care. The case was then remanded for a consideration of
additional damages denied at trial and alleged by the plaintiff on
appeal.6
The inconsistent decisions reached by the supreme court and court
of appeals concerning the issue of government immunity in the
58. See Doe/Hooton v. City of Albuquerque, 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 775 (Ct. App. Aug-
ust 14, 1980) and Methola v. County of Eddy, 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 696 (Ct. App. July 31,
1980).
59. 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 775.
60. 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 696.
61. The Doe/Hooton cases were consolidated at trial and a judgment was entered upon a
jury verdict in favor of both plaintiffs. 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 775. The Methola case was
tried to the court without a jury, which entered judgment for the plaintiff. 19 N.M. St. Bar
Bull. at 696.
62. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (1978). The full text of this provision states that:
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4 NMSA
1978 does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful
death or property damage resulting from assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation
of character, violation of property rights or deprivation of any rights, priv-
ileges or immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States
or New Mexico when caused by law enforcement officers while acting within
the scope of their duties. (Emphasis added).
63. 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 777.
64. 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 699.
65. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 143, 622 P.2d at 239.
66. Id.
67. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 661 (Ct. App. June 25, 1981).
68. Id. Section 41-4-19 of the Act limits recovery for personal injuries to the sum of
$300,000. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19 (1978). See note 21 supra.
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Methola6 9 and Doe/Hooton7 ° cases, stemmed from conflicting judi-
cial interpretations of the Act. Section 12"1 states that the immunity
granted under the Act:
does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily injury, wrong-
ful death or property damage resulting from [the enumerated activi-
ties] ... when caused by law enforcement officers while acting
within the scope of their duties. (Emphasis added).
The court of appeals in Methola,7 2 refused to read the word
"caused" under the technical definition applied in tort law to include
negligent acts. The court reasoned that the legislature did not intend
that Section 12 be read in a manner which would hold law enforce-
ment officers liable for negligent acts committed within the scope of
their duties. On this basis, the court found the government immune
from suit under the policy and purpose of the Act which was to limit
the liability of governmental entities and public employees.73
The supreme court upheld the claims presented in Methola by
finding that the legislature intended the words "caused by," as stated
under the language of Section 12, to include the enumerated acts
which were caused by the negligence of law enforcement officers act-
ing within the scope of their duties. 7 ' The court reasoned that since
the Act derogated a claimant's common law rights to sue the govern-
ment for negligence, it should be strictly construed insofar as it mod-
ifies the common law. 7 6 The court interpreted the declared policy of
the Act 7 ' as indicating that the legislature authorized the filing of
claims against governmental entities for all acts listed within the stat-
ute, except in a situation where the State was unable to act for a spe-
cific reason. 7 8 The court then found that the legislature intended to
permit actions against law enforcement officers in negligence cases
on the basis of the Act and its subsequent amendments, even though
the basic concept in the original Act was to recreate the sovereign im-
69. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 138, 622 P.2d 234 (1980); 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 696 (Ct. App.
July 31, 1980).
70. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 138, 622 P.2d 234 (1980); 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull 696 (Ct. App.
July 31, 1980).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (1978). See note 62supra.
72. 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 699. The court applied similar reasoning in support of its
decision in Doe/Hooton v. City of Albuquerque, 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 777.
73. 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 699; 19 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 777.
74. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (1978). See note 62 supra.
75. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 142, 622 P.2d at 238.
76. Id.
77. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-2 (1978). See note 8 supra, for the text of this provi-
sion.
78. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. at 142, 622 P.2d at 238.
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munity abolished in Hicks v. State." 9 The decision reached by the
court of appeals in its recent reconsideration of Methola,8 0 supports
the supreme court's position on claims arising under the New Mexico
Tort Claims Act.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act indicate
a definite preference towards construing the legislative exceptions to
immunity in favor of those who have brought claims against the gov-
ernment. The New Mexico judiciary is obviously motivated by differ-
ent policy considerations than those stated by the legislature under
the Act. The analysis employed and the decision reached in the
Methola case illustrate the New Mexico Supreme Court's intent to ig-
nore the purpose, design and language of the Tort Claims Act when
construing its terms. The supreme court's position has been adopted
by the court of appeals in recent cases decided under the Act. Judi-
cial reliance on the policies which led to the abolition of the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity has enabled New Mexico courts
to uphold the Hicks decision in the face of superseding legislation.
The state judiciary has thus mitigated the harsh effects of govern-
ment immunity as it is imposed under the New Mexico Tort Claims
Act, thereby defeating the legislative purposes which underlie its re-
strictive structure and design.
JOCELYN M. TORRES
79. Id.
80. 20 N.M. St. Bar Bull. 661 (Ct. App. June 25, 1981). See text accompanying notes
66-6 7 supra.
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